Known constructions of blind signature schemes suffer from at least one of the following limitations: (1) rely on parties having access to a common reference string or a random oracle, (2) are not round-optimal, or (3) are prohibitively expensive.
Our Results
We construct the first blind signature scheme that avoids all of the above limitations, namely it is very efficient, round optimal and does not rely on a random oracle or a setup. We obtain parameters for our scheme by using the concept of work factors from [Gal04, BR09] . A summary of the results is highlighted in Table 1 . 1 To give an estimate on how big this polynomial is, we instantiate the proofs being given in their construction with Dwork-Naor Zaps using Kilian-Petrank NIZKs and get communication complexity of at least O(κ 9 ) bits. One can also use asymptotically more efficient ZAPs instantiated with PCP based Groth NIZKs with ultimate proof size being O(κ 5 poly log(κ)). Note that polylog(κ) factor is quite large and for reasonable security parameters proof size would be comparable to O(κ 7 ).
2 This scheme uses general MPC techniques and can be instantiated using arbitrary signature scheme and thus has small signatures.
-Standard Setting: We assume the sub-exponential hardness of Decisional Linear (DLIN) Assumption and a variant of the discrete-log assumption. Then our signature scheme has one signature of size 6.5 KB and the communication complexity of signing protocol roughly 100 KB.
-Amortized Setting: A number of applications require a user to obtain multiple signatures from the same signer. In such a setting, for our scheme almost all of the communication costs can be avoided. More specifically an amortized variant of our scheme has communication cost roughly 100 KB when obtaining the first signature. However, for every subsequent signature obtained the communication cost is less that 1 KB.
-Stronger assumption: Assuming a stronger assumption, namely sub-exponentially hard q-Simultaneous Flexible Pairing Assumption (SFP) from [AHO10] we can improve the size of a signature and the amortized communication complexity of our signing protocol by roughly a factor of 2.
Qualitative Improvements.
[GRS + 11] uses complexity leveraging to obtain standard model round optimal blind signature scheme, and it is the use of these techniques which makes this scheme so inefficient. However, unfortunately, impossibility results of Fischlin et al. [FS10] and Pass [Pas11] roughly indicate that the use of these techniques is essential for getting round optimal scheme in the standard model. Nonetheless, in this work, we introduce new techniques to reduce and optimize the use of complex leveraging, and thereby obtain a significantly more efficient scheme.
• Reducing the use of complexity leveraging. The technique of complexity leveraging works by creating a gap between the power of an adversarial entity and the reduction proving security. However, many a times this gap needs to be created multiple times in a layered fashion leading to larger parameters. The previous scheme of Garg et al. [GRS + 11] needed to create this gap twice. However, in our scheme, we only need to create this gap once and this allows us to get smaller parameters.
• Optimizing the use of complexity leveraging. Complexity leveraging techniques (particularly for our application) inherently make non-black-box use of the underlying primitives.
[GRS + 11] in their construction end up rolling out the cryptographic primitive and viewing it as circuit. This leads to prohibitively inefficient schemes. We also make non-black-box use of the underlying primitive but avoid viewing it as a circuit. Instead, we cast it directly as a set of very structured equations which fit the framework of Groth-Sahai proofs, drastically improving the communication complexity of our protocol.
Starting Point. The starting point for our construction is to use a blind signature scheme in the common reference string (CRS) model and remove the need for the CRS by letting the signer generate it. Of course this is problematic because a malicious signer can generate the CRS dishonestly (e.g. in a way such that it knows the trapdoors associated with the CRS) and use that to break the blindness property of the scheme. We solve this problem by using a special blind signature scheme for which blindness is statistical as long as the CRS is sampled from a certain "honest" distribution. In this setting, it is enough for the signer to prove that the CRS is sampled from the "honest" distribution. Looking ahead, this "honest" distribution is actually the CRS distribution for GS proofs in the hiding mode. However, we are faced with the following three issues.
Issue 1) First, in order to ensure blindness, the signer needs to prove to the user that the CRS was indeed sampled from the "honest" distribution.
Issue 2) Secondly, for proving unforgeability we will need that the reduction playing as the signer can "simulate" this proof. In other words, we need that the proof does not leak anything to the user.
Issue 3) The third issue is more subtle and arises as an interleaving of the first two issues. Specifically, the reduction for arguing unforgeability should be able to "extract" the messages on which the signatures are being issued and simulate the view of the attacking user. In other words, this extraction and simulation process should go unnoticed in the view of the attacking user. However, if a cheating signer could replicate the same behavior then this would go unnoticed as well. Hence, we certainly need to rule this out.
Before we describe our attempts to solve these issues, we note that for [GRS + 11], this proof is the main reason for inefficiency.
Attempt at using range proofs. As mentioned before, complexity leveraging makes non-blackbox use of primitives essential making schemes prohibitively inefficient. In order to solve this issue we need to identify a problem such that: (1) the problem can be algebraically stated in groups of prime order p and has an efficient Groth-Sahai proof, (2) but solving the problem should be much easier than solving discrete log in the group of order p. The first property of the problem ensures efficiency of the proof. The second property as we will see later will be essential in making the complexity leveraging argument. We start by using a simple problem of solving discrete-log when the domain is restricted to some subspace. In particular, the problem we consider is: Given C = g c such that c < q (where q << p), one needs to find c. We then show that it satisfies both the above properties. In particular, we will show that this problem can be cast in the language of efficient Groth-Sahai proofs thus satisfying the first requirement. Secondly, improvement in the brute-force attack when the sample space is restricted to c < q is easy to see.
For the protocol, our idea is that user sends the value g c for c < q to the signer. Further instead of having the signer prove that the CRS was sampled honestly we have him prove that either the CRS was honestly generated or that it is aware of c. This immediately solves our problems 1 and 2 from above. We know that a cheating signer will not be able to recover c and hence will not be able to cheat. At the same time we can have the reduction for unforgeability extract c and thereby generate simulated proofs.
However our solution to issues 1 and 2 has created a 4 th issue. A cheating user may cheat by generating g c such that c ≥ q. Next, we will show how issues 3 and 4 can be solved.
Solving issue 3. Very interestingly we can resolve issue 3 by requiring that the signer generates the proof above under the CRS he had sampled for the underling blind signature scheme. This is very counter-intuitive as we are requiring the signer to generate a proof under a CRS that it generates on its own. The key idea is based on the observation that all we need is that the signer generates the CRS from the hiding distribution for Groth-Sahai proofs. If this CRS is indeed hiding then the whole exercise of having a proof is redundant. On the other hand, if this CRS is actually generated dishonestly from the binding distribution then the signer is only hurting itself as it will not be able to generate his proof. 3
Solving issue 4. Recall that the 4 th issue was that the user might generate g c in a way such that c > q. We solve this problem by having the user provide a Groth-Sahai proof that the value c used is less that q. A question is under what CRS should this proof be give such that this proof does not leak c to the signer? Of course, we can not use the CRS that the signer generated for the underlying scheme. Our key observation here again is that we need to worry about this proof only if the original CRS has been generated maliciously, or in other words, if this CRS is binding. Recall that a binding CRS for Groth-Sahai proofs is a DLIN tuple. Our key idea here is that if (g, g 1 , g 2 , h 1 , h 2 , h) is a DLIN tuple then its shift (g, g 1 , g 2 , h 1 , h 2 , h · g) can not be a DLIN tuple and hence the user can give his proof under this shifted CRS. 4
Preliminaries
In this section, we recall and define basic notation and primitives used briefly. For a detailed description of primitives, see full version [GG14] . Let λ denote the security parameter. We call a function negligible in λ if it is asymptotically smaller than any inverse polynomial. For a detailed description of blind signatures and its security properties refer to Appendix B. Now, we define the primitives used in our construction.
Commitment scheme on groups. We describe a perfectly binding commitment scheme based on the decisional linear (DLIN) assumption (see definition 1) with the special property that both the message space and the commitment comprise only of group elements. Let (p, G, G T , g, e) be a prime order bilinear pairing group. Then the function Com G (·) generates a commitment to an element m ∈ G by first sampling g 1 , g 2 $ ← − G, x, y $ ← − Z p and then outputting (g, g 1 , g 2 , g x 1 , g y 2 , m · g x+y ). For description of properties of commitment schemes see Appendix A.2.
Structure-Preserving Signatures. A signature scheme (SPGen, SPSign, SPVerify) is said to be a structure preserving signature scheme over a prime order bilinear group (p, G, G T , g, e)(see Appendix A.1), if public keys, signatures and messages to be signed are vectors of group elements and verification only evaluates pairing product equations. For definition of security of signature schemes refer to Appendix A.3. Structure preserving signature schemes that sign a vector of group elements are known under different assumptions [Gro06, AHO10, ACD + 12]. The first feasibility result was given by Groth [Gro06] . This scheme is inefficient as the signature size grows linearly with the number of group elements in the message to be signed and the constants are quite big. In our scheme, we will use constant size structure preserving signatures [AHO10, ACD + 12]. Both of these results have been summarized in the table given below. The size of different parameters are in terms of number of group elements. When k is a constant, a public key as well as a signature generated consist of a constant number of group elements only. Hence, these schemes are highly efficient for constant size messages. From the security of these schemes, it follows that under assumptions which are hard to break in time T·poly(λ), these schemes are secure against existential forgery under chosen message attack for adversaries running in time T·poly(λ). More precisely, these schemes are T-eu-cma-secure (see Appendix A.3) under hardness of T-q-SFP and T-DLIN, respectively.
Two-CRS Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs.
In this section, we will define a special notion of NIZK proofs that work in the setting with two common reference strings.
Let R be an efficiently computable binary relation. For pairs (x, w) ∈ R we call x the statement and w the witness. Let L be the language consisting of statements in R. A Two-CRS non-interactive proof system for a relation R consists of three common reference string (CRS) generation algorithms K B , Shift and Shift −1 , a prover algorithm P and a verification algorithm V. We require that all these algorithms be efficient, i.e. polynomial time. The CRS generation algorithm K B takes the security parameter 1 λ as input and produces a common reference string crs along with an extraction key τ . Both Shift and Shift −1 are deterministic algorithms. They take as input a string crs and output another string crs . The prover algorithm P takes as input (crs, x, w) and produces a proof π. The verification algorithm V takes as input (crs, x, π) and outputs 1 or 0. We require that:
CRS Indistinguishability. For all PPT adversaries A, we define Adv CRS−distinguish
We say that a Two-CRS NIZK system has CRS indistinguishability if for all PPT adversaries
Perfect Completeness. Completeness requires that an honest prover with a valid witness can always make an honest verifier output 1.
where • is the the composition of functions, we require that for all x, w such that (x, w) ∈ R:
Pr V(crs, x, π) = 1 crs ← K(1 λ ); π ← P(crs, x, w) = 1.
Perfect Knowledge Extraction. We require that there exists a probabilistic polynomial time knowledge extractor E such that for every (crs, τ ) ← K B (1 λ ), x and purported proof π such that V(crs, x, π) = 1 then we have
Pr (x, w) ∈ R w := E(crs, τ, x, π) = 1.
Note that since perfect knowledge extraction implies the existence of a witness for the statement being proven, it implies perfect soundness.
Perfect Zero-Knowledge. A proof system is zero-knowledge if the proofs do not reveal any information about the witnesses. We require that there exists a polynomial time simulator S such that for all (crs, τ ) ← K B (1 λ ), crs := Shift(crs) (or, crs := Shift −1 (crs)) we have that for all x ∈ L the distributions P(crs , x, w) and S(crs , τ, x) are identical.
Efficient realization of Two-CRS NIZKs based on Groth-Sahai Proofs. Groth-Sahai proofs [GS08] can be used to give efficient Two-CRS NIZKs (under the DLIN assumption) for special languages, namely pairing product equations, multi-scalar multiplication equations, and quadratic equations (described below) in the setting of symmetric bilinear groups. For details, refer to Appendix C. We also show that the range equations also fit this framework (Appendix C.1). Next, we describe these equations formally.
The range equation over the variable c ∈ Z p is of the form.
determined by constants C ∈ G and q < p. We note that the range equation is not explicitly a part of the Groth-Sahai framework but is implied by it. We establish this in Appendix C.1.
5 General form of PPE can have any T ∈ GT on the R.H.S. Since GS NIZKs are only known for PPE having 1 on the R.H.S., we use only such equations in our construction.
6 Multiscalar Multiplication Equations can be defined for more general setting when y1, . . . , ym come from Zp. In our case, we define it for a more restricted setting because of technical reason discussed in Appendix C.
7 Quadratic Equations can be defined for more general setting when y1, . . . , ym come from Zp. In our case, we define it for a more restricted setting because of technical reason discussed in Appendix C.
Remark 1. We note that for the first three kinds of equations, under the above mentioned realization of Two-CRS NIZKs, the proof size grows only linearly with the number of variables and the number of equations. This follows directly from the GS proofs as explained in Appendix C.
Remark 2. As shown in Appendix C.1, a range equation can be expressed as one multiscalar multiplication equation and log 2uadratic equations over log 2 q variables in Z p .
Blind Signature Scheme: Construction
We begin by giving an informal description of the scheme. In our scheme, we will use a bilinear group G of prime order p, a structure preserving signature scheme for signing vectors of elements in this group, Two-CRS NIZKs, and commitment scheme Com G .
During the key generation phase, the signer generates the verification key vk and the secret key sk for the blind signature scheme as follows. vk consists of a verification key vk SP for the structure preserving signature scheme, two CRSes, crs 1 and crs 2 under Two-CRS NIZK proof system, and a parameter q = p for some constant ∈ (0, 1). crs 1 is sampled from K B and crs 2 is set to be the shifted crs 1 , i.e. crs 2 ← Shift(crs 1 ). sk consists of the signing key sk SP corresponding to vk SP and the extraction key τ for crs 1 .
Next, the two round blind signature scheme proceeds as follows: In the first round, the user generates its message as follows: It begins by checking whether crs 2 equals Shift(crs 1 ). It aborts, if this is not the case. Next, it blinds its message m by generating a commitment m blind using Com G under randomness r. Then, it samples a random c < q and sets C = g c . Finally, it generates a proof π under crs 1 for the NP-statement Φ: ∃ c | g c = C c < q. It sends (m blind , C, π) as the first round message to the signer.
In the second round, the signer generates its message as follows: It begins by checking if the proof π is valid under crs 1 . It aborts, if this is not the case. Next, it extracts the witness c from the proof π using extraction key τ . Then it generates a fresh proof π for the statement Φ under crs 2 . Finally, it generates a signature σ SP on m blind using signing key sk SP . It sends (π , σ SP ) as the second round message to the user.
On receiving the above message from the user, it computes the signature on m as follows: User aborts if π is not a valid proof under crs 2 . It then checks if σ SP is a valid signature on m blind under vk SP . It aborts if this is not the case. Otherwise, it outputs σ as the proof under crs 2 of the NP-statement Ψ: ∃ (m blind , r, σ SP ) | m blind = Com G (m; r) SPVerify(vk SP , m blind , σ SP ) = 1. In other words, the user proves that there exists (m blind , r, σ SP ) such that m blind is the commitment of m using randomness r under commitment scheme Com G and σ SP is a valid signature on m blind .
To verify a signature σ on message m, check whether σ is a valid proof for the statement Ψ under crs 2 .
Formal Description. Let SPSig = (SPGen, SPSign, SPVerify) be any structure preserving signature scheme which is existentially unforgeable, (K B , Shift, Shift −1 , P, V) be a Two-CRS NIZK proof system, Com G be the DLIN based commitment scheme for elements in G (Section 2). Formal description of the blind signature scheme (Gen, S, U, Vrfy) is given in Figure 1 .
Proof of Unforgeability
Let T dlog G,q be the time it takes to break the discrete log problem in G when exponents are chosen from Z q .
Recalling from Section 2, let (SPGen, SPSign, SPVerify) be an existentially unforgeable structure preserving signature scheme, (K B , Shift, Shift −1 , P, V) be a Two-CRS NIZK proof system and Com G be a group based commitment scheme. And let 0 < < 1 be an appropriate (specified later) constant parameter.
Key Generation Gen: On input 1 λ , choose an appropriate bilinear group (p, G, G T , g, e) a and proceed as follows:
• Sample a key pair for the structure preserving signature scheme (sk SP , vk SP ) ← SPGen(1 λ ).
• Sample a CRS (crs 1 , τ ) ← K B (1 λ ) and generate its shift crs 2 ← Shift(crs 1 ).
• Output the verification-key for the blind signature scheme as vk = (vk SP , crs 1 , crs 2 , q = p ) and the secret-key as sk = (sk SP , τ ).
Signing Protocol: The user U with input m ∈ G, vk SP and the signer S with input sk SP proceed as follows.
• Round 1: The user U generates its first message as follows:
-Samples a uniformly random c such that c < q and sets C :
-Send (m blind , C, π) to the signer.
• Round 2: S generates the second round message as:
-If V(crs 1 , Φ, π) = 1 then abort, otherwise obtain c := E(crs 1 , τ, Φ, π) and sample a proof π ← P(crs 2 , Φ, c). -Sample a signature σ SP := SPSign(sk SP , m blind ).
-Send (π , σ SP ) to the user U.
• Signature Generation: U aborts if V(crs 2 , Φ, π ) = 1.
U also aborts if SPVerify(vk SP , m blind , σ SP ) = 1 and otherwise outputs σ ← P(crs 2 , Ψ, (m blind , r, σ SP )) where Ψ is the NP-statement:
Signature Verification Vrfy: For input a claimed signature σ on message m, output V(crs 2 , Ψ, σ).
a All algorithms take this bilinear group as an implicit input.
Figure 1: Blind Signature Scheme
Theorem 1. For any PPT malicious user U * for the unforgeability game against the blind signature scheme given in Section 3 the following holds:
where B is an adversary against the CRS indistinguishability property of the two-CRS NIZK proof system such that T(B) = k·T dlog G,q +T(U * )+poly(λ) and U * is the adversary against the unforgeability of the underlying structure preserving signature scheme SPSig such that T( U * ) = k ·T dlog G,q +T(U * )+ poly(λ). Also, U * and U * make at most k signing queries.
If we use GS proof system based Two-CRS NIZKs (see Appendix C) in our construction, the above theorem immediately implies the following corollary:
Corollary 1. For any PPT malicious user U * for the unforgeability game against the blind signature scheme given in Section 3 the following holds:
where B is an adversary against the DLIN assumption in G such that T(B) = k · T dlog G,q + T(U * ) + poly(λ) and U * is the adversary against the unforgeability of the underlying structure preserving signature scheme SPSig such that T( U * ) = k · T dlog G,q + T(U * ) + poly(λ). Also, U * and U * make at most k signing queries.
Following is a corollary of the above theorem:
Theorem 2. Assume that T dlog G,q -DLIN holds in G and SPSig is T dlog G,q -eu-cma-unforgeable. Then the blind signature scheme in Section 3 is unforgeable.
Proof. (of Theorem 1) Let U * be any PPT malicious user then we will prove our theorem by considering a sequence of games starting with the unforgeabilty game from Definition 7 (see Appendix B).
• Game 0 : This is the challenger-adversary game between the challenger following the honest signer S specification and the malicious user U * . More specifically, the game starts with the challenger generating a key pair (sk, vk). The challenger then sends vk to U * . At this point the challenger (playing as the honest signer) and U * proceed by interacting in k executions of the signing protocol. Note that the challenger knows the secret key sk and uses it to participate as the signer in the executions of the signing protocol. Finally U * outputs k + 1 message/signature pairs (m i , σ i ). U * is said to win if all the messages are distinct and all signatures verify under vk.
• Game 1 : Recall that in the second round of the signing protocol the challenger (acting as the signer) obtains the secret value c using the extraction algorithm E. Game 1 is same as the Game 0 except that in each of the k instances of the signing protocol, instead of extracting the secret c using the extraction algorithm, the challenger obtains c by evaluating the discrete log of C assuming that it is less than q. (The challenger aborts if no values less than q is a valid dlog of C.)
Note that since crs 1 is sampled from K B , proofs under crs 1 are perfectly sound. This implies that the value c that challenger extracts by solving discrete log is exactly the same as the one that challenger would have extracted using the extraction algorithm in Game 0 .
Note that the views of the malicious user U * in games Game 0 and Game 1 are identical.
It also follows from the perfect soundness of the two-CRS NIZK proof system that the challenger in Game 1 runs in time k · T dlog G,q + poly(λ), where T dlog G,q is the time it takes to break discrete log problem in G when the exponent is chosen from Z q .
• Game 2 : Game 2 is same as Game 1 except that the challenger generates the CRSes differently.
Instead of generating the CRSes by first sampling (crs 1 , τ ) ← K B (1 λ ) and then generating its shift crs 2 ← Shift(crs 1 ), it reverses the order in which the CRSes are generated. This reverses the security properties of proofs under the two CRSes. More specifically the challenger first samples (crs 2 , τ ) ← K B (1 λ ) and then sets crs 1 := Shift −1 (crs 2 ). Note that now we get perfect zero-knowledge for crs 1 and perfect soundness for crs 2 .
Indistinguishability of Game 1 and Game 2 follows from the CRS-Indistinguishability property of the two-CRS NIZK proof system. More precisely, the success probability of U * can change by at most Adv CRS−distinguish B , where B is an adversary against the CRS indistinguishability property of the two-CRS NIZK proof system such that T(B) = k · T dlog G,q + T(U * ) + poly(λ).
Now we will show how U * who wins in Game 2 can be used to construct a malicious user U * that winning the existential unforgeability game of the underlying structure preserving signature scheme.
U * starts by obtaining the verification key vk SP from the challenger of the structure preserving signature scheme (SPGen, SPSign, SPVerify). Furthermore, it samples (crs 2 , τ ) ← K B (1 λ ), sets crs 1 := Shift −1 (crs 2 ) and invokes U * with (vk SP , crs 1 , crs 2 , q) as input. At this point, the user U * expects to interact in k instances of the signing protocol. In each of these executions, it provides its challenger (the adversary U * in our case) with its first round message (m blind , C, π). Our adversary U * obtains c by solving the discrete log problem (aborting if c ≥ q) and uses the extracted value to generate the response proof π . Additionally, it obtains the signature σ SP on m blind from the signing oracle and passes (π , σ SP ) to U * . After k such executions, U * returns k +1 pairs (m j , σ j ). Note that each σ j given by U * is a proof of knowledge of (m blind,j , r j , σ SP,j ) under crs 2 . Furthermore, since U * generates crs 2 in the binding setting, therefore τ can be used to extract (m blind,j , r j , σ SP,j ) for each j by invoking E(crs 2 , τ, Ψ, σ j ). Since all messages m j are distinct and Com G is perfectly binding, all m blind,j will also be distinct. Since all m blind,j are distinct there exists at least one m blind,j * among these that U * never queried its challenger. U * outputs (m blind,j * , σ SP,j * ) as its output.
Hence, the advantage of U * in producing a valid forgery in Game 3 is at most the advantage of U * in producing a valid forgery against the underlying structure preserving signature scheme, i.e. Adv Unforge U * ,BS,Game 3 ≤ Adv Unforge 
Proof of Blindness
Theorem 3. For any PPT malicious signer S * for the blindness game against the blind signature scheme given in Section 3, which successfully completes the blindness game, the following holds
where A is an adversary against the non-uniform hiding property of Com G such that T(A) = T(S * ) + poly(λ) and B is an adversary against the non-uniform discrete log problem in G when exponents are chosen uniformly randomly in Z q such that T(B) = T(S * ) + poly(λ).
Since the hiding property of the commitment scheme Com G holds under the DLIN assumption (definition 1) in G, the above theorem immediately implies the following corollary. Since the hiding property of the Com G holds under the DLIN assumption in G, the above theorem immediately implies the following corollary.
Corollary 2. For any PPT malicious signer S * for the blindness game against the blind signature scheme given in Section 3, which successfully completes the blindness game, the following holds
where C is an adversary against the non-uniform DLIN assumption in G such that T(C) = T(S * ) + poly(λ) and B is an adversary against the non-uniform discrete log problem in G when exponents are chosen uniformly randomly in Z q such that T(B) = T(S * ) + poly(λ).
Following is a corollary of the above.
Theorem 4. Assume that non-uniform DLIN assumption holds in G and the non-uniform discrete log assumption holds in G even when the exponents are chosen uniformly randomly from Z q . Then the blind signature scheme from Section 3 is blind.
Proof. (of Theorem 3) Let S * be any PPT malicious signer then we will prove our theorem by considering a sequence of games starting with the blindness game from Definition 8 (see Appendix B).
• Game 0 : This is a challenger-adversary game between the challenger following the honest user strategy and the malicious signer S * . The malicious signer S * has full control over the scheduling of instances of the user in an arbitrary order. Since our scheme is only two round, we can fix it to be the worst case ordering. Since S * does not receive any response to the message it sends to the user, we can assume that S * first gathers all the incoming messages from the user and then sends its responses. Thus, without loss of generality, the Game 0 proceeds as follows: S * first outputs the public key vk and the challenge messages m 0 , m 1 . S * then expects the two incoming blinded messages m blind,0 and m blind,1 from the user corresponding to m b , m 1−b for a random bit b. After receiving both the messages, S * outputs its responses to the challenger. Our challenger at this point outputs the signature on (m 0 , m 1 ) generated in the two protocol executions. Finally the malicious signer S * outputs a bit b and its advantage Adv Unblind S * ,BS is equal to |2 · Pr[b = b ] − 1|.
• Game 1 : Same as Game 0 except the following: The challenger after receiving the public key vk, figures out whether crs 2 is in the range of K B or not. The challenger may execute in unbounded time when figuring this out; storing the extraction key τ for later use. Now it proceeds as follows:
-crs 2 is in the range of K B : In this case, our challenger proceeds just as in Game 0 , except that if the first instance of the signing protocol completes successfully then our challenger outputs DL-Abort.
-crs 2 is not in the range of K B : Proceed as in Game 0 .
Note that conditioned on the fact that DL-Abort does not happen, we have that Game 0 and Game 1 are identical. Next we will show that the probability of DL-Abort happening is bounded by Adv dlog B,G,q .
Lemma 1. The probability of DL-Abort happening is bounded by Adv dlog B,G,q , with T(B) = T(S * ) + poly(λ), B is an adversary against the non-uniform discrete log problem in G when exponents are chosen uniformly randomly in Z q .
Proof. We will show that an S * that can make our challenger output DL-Abort can be used to construct an adversary B that breaks the non-uniform discrete log problem in G when the exponent is restricted to < q.
Constructing the adversary B. Given this cheating signer S * , there exists random coins for S * such that our challenger in Game-1 outputs DL-Abort. We will hard-code the random coins of S * such that our challenger outputs DL-Abort with maximum probability. Note that we are in the case when crs 2 is binding and hence crs 1 is hiding. Next, our adversary B or the challenger of the blindness game on receiving this public key vk will run in unbounded time to compute the extraction key τ for crs 2 . Thus, the adversary B we constructed is a non-uniform adversary with auxiliary input as the random coins of S * (specified above) and the extraction key τ corresponding to vk.
Our adversary B obtains as input D (such that D = g d with d < q) and it wins if it outputs d. On receiving D, B proceeds as the challenger does in Game 1 except that it sets C := D instead of choosing a fresh value for C. Also, invoking perfect zero-knowledge property of crs 1 , B generates π as S(crs 1 , τ, Φ), where S is the zero-knowledge simulator. At this point S * must output a proof π such that V(crs 2 , Φ, π ) = 1 for the challenger in Game 1 to output DL-Abort. On obtaining the proof π , B outputs E(crs 2 , τ, Φ, π ) as the discrete log of D. By perfect extraction under crs 2 , the extracted value will be the discrete log of D.
Note that after receiving the challenge D, B runs in polynomial time. Thus, the probability of DL-Abort when we fix the worst case random coins of S * (as described above) is bounded by Adv dlog B,G,q . Hence, it holds that the probability of DL-Abort in Game 1 is bounded by Adv dlog B,G,q .
• Game 2 : Game 2 is identical to Game 1 except for the following modifications. Instead of generating the final signatures honestly, the challenger simulates them. More specifically, instead of generating the signatures as P(crs 2 , Ψ, (m blind , r, σ SP )), in Game 2 the challenger generates signatures as S(crs 2 , τ, Ψ).
Game 2 and Game 1 are perfectly indistinguishable based on the non-uniform perfect zeroknowledge property of the two-CRS NIZK proof system.
• Game 3 : Now, we modify Game 2 and remove all dependencies on the input messages m 0 and m 1 . That is, we let the user algorithm compute the blinded message m blind,0 as Com G (0) instead of Com G (m b ). We proceed similarly for m 1−b .
The indistinguishability between Game 3 and Game 2 follows from the non-uniform computational hiding property of the commitment scheme Com G .
Since in Game 3 the entire transcript is independent of the message, Adv Unblind S * ,BS,Game 3 is 0.
Concrete Efficiency
In this section we will compute the communication complexity for the blind signature scheme described in Section 3 and the size of the final blind signature. First we need to compute the group size p and number q which will give us the desired level of security. For this we will calculate the work factors for different adversaries as discussed below. We begin by defining the work factors.
Work Factors. These have been used in [Gal04, BR09] to calculate concrete parameters. This text has been taken verbatim from [BR09] . For any adversary running in time T(A) and gaining advantage , we define the w ork factor of A to be WF(A) ≤ T(A)/ . The ratio of A's running time to its advantage provides a measure of efficiency of the adversary. Generally speaking, to resist an adversary with work factor WF(A), a scheme should have its security parameter (bits of security) be κ ≥ log WF(A). Note that for a particular , this means a run time of T(A) ≤ 2 κ . Similar to [Gal04, BR09] , in the discussion that follows we will assume that Pollard Rho's algorithm for finding discrete logs in G is the best known attack 8 against DLIN in group G of prime order p. The work factor of Pollard's algorithm ends up being WF(P) = T (P) p = 0.88 e √ p log 2 (p) 10 3
For security we require that the work factor of any adversary A against DLIN is at most the work factor of Pollard's algorithm, i.e. WF(A) ≤ WF(P).
Parameters. In the Appendix D, we calculate the values of p and q using the work factors for adversaries against the blindness game and unforgeability game. We summarize the parameters obtained in Table 3 . Table 3 : Suggested parameters, where k is the number of signature queries and the adversary is allowed to run in time t · T R where T R is the time taken by the reduction.
k t log q log |G| 2 20 2 30 155 291 2 20 2 40 155 311 2 30 2 30 155 331 2 30 2 40 155 351
Efficiency
Verification key size. In our blind signature scheme, the verification key is vk = (vk SP , crs 1 , crs 2 , q = p ), where vk SP is the verification key of the structure preserving signature scheme in G and crs 1 and crs 2 are two CRSes for Two-CRS NIZK. Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 2 , to sign k group elements, vk SP has 2k + 25 group elements. Since in our case k = 6, there are 37 group elements in vk SP . In GS proof system, we need 6 group elements in G to represent crs 1 and crs 2 . Hence, the size of the verification key for our scheme is 43 group elements. Taking the number of bits to represent a group element as 291 bits, we get the key size to be 1.6KB.
Signature size. The final signature is a Groth-Sahai [GS08] proof of knowledge in G using crs 2 as the common reference string. Under the DLIN assumption, the proof size is three group elements for each variable and nine group elements for each pairing product equation (see Figure 2 in [GS08] ) that is proved. The variables are m blind , σ SP , r. By Com G , m blind has six group elements and in order to prove m blind = Com G (m; r), we will have two additional variables (which capture the randomness r used in commitment) and three pairing product equations in total. Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 2 , σ SP has 17 group elements and nine pairing product equations in verification algorithm. Hence, the size of the final blind signature will be 183 group elements in G. Taking the number of bits to represent a group element as 291 bits, we get the signature size to be 6.5KB.
Communication complexity. We begin by computing the communication complexity of the user step by step as follows:
• U computes a commitment m blind in G which consists of six group elementsin G.
• It computes a range proof π for an NP-statement which consists of log 2uadratic equations and one multiscalar multiplication equation over log 2 q variables in Z p (Remark 2). In GS proof system, each quadratic equations adds six group elements, multiscalar multiplication equation adds nine group elements and each variable in Z p adds three group elements to the proof ([GS08], Figure 2 ). Using this, π consists of 9 log 2 q + 9 group elements of G.
Now we compute the communication complexity of signer as follows:
• It computes σ SP consisting of 17 elements in G as explained above.
• It also computes a range proof π for the same NP-statement as the user. As above, π consists of 9 log 2 q + 9 group elements of G.
Hence, the overall communication complexity of our blind signature protocol is 18 log 2 q + 41 elements in G. Taking log 2 q as 155 and log 2 p as 291, the communication complexity is 100.56KB.
[MSF10] Sarah Meiklejohn, Hovav Shacham, and David Mandell Freeman. Limitations on transformations from composite-order to prime-order groups: The case of round-optimal blind signatures. In ASIACRYPT, pages 519-538, 2010.
[Oka06] Tatsuaki Okamoto. Efficient blind and partially blind signatures without random oracles. In TCC, pages 80-99, 2006.
[Pas11] Rafael Pass. Limits of provable security from standard assumptions. In STOC, pages 109-118, 2011.
[ 
A Preliminaries
Now we will describe various tools and assumptions we use in our round optimal blind signature scheme.
A.1 Bilinear Groups.
Let G and G T be two groups of prime order p. Let g be a generator of G. Let e : G × G → G T be a bilinear map with the following properties:
• e(g, g) does not evaluate to the identity element of G T . We say that the map e is nondegenerate.
• ∀u ∈ G, ∀v ∈ G, ∀a, b ∈ Z p : e(u a , v b ) = e(u, v) ab . We say that the map e is bilinear.
Bilinear groups G, with efficient group operations, and for which a target group G T exists with an efficient corresponding bilinear map e, are well-known. Note that this bilinear map is also symmetric since e(g a , g b ) = e(g, g) ab = e(g b , g a ).
Def inition 1. [Decisional Linear Assumption (DLIN)] Let G = g be a bilinear group of prime order p with security parameter λ. For a non-uniform PPT A, its advantage Adv DLIN A,G is defined as:
We say that the DLIN assumption holds for a bilinear group G if for all PPT algorithms A, Adv DLIN A,G is negligible in λ. More generally, we say that T -DLIN assumption holds in group G if for every T · poly(λ) time algorithm A, Adv DLIN A,G is negligible in λ.
Def inition 2.
[Discrete Log Assumption (DLog)] Let G = g be a bilinear group of prime order p with security parameter λ. For a non-uniform PPT A, its advantage Adv dlog A,G is defined as:
We say that the discrete log assumption holds for a group G if for all PPT algorithms A, Adv dlog
A.2 Non-interactive Commitment Scheme.
A commitment scheme Com takes as input a message m ∈ {0, 1} λ and randomness r and outputs a commitment cmt. To decommit, the committer sends m, r. Any commitment scheme Com must satisfy two properties: hiding and binding. In our construction, we will use a scheme which is computational hiding and perfectly binding. Below we describe these properties.
Computationally hiding property says that that no PPT adversary can distinguish between the commitments of any two different messages. More precisely, let A be an adversary against the hiding property of the scheme Com. We define its hiding-advantage as
Def inition 3. Com is computationally hiding if the advantage function Adv hid A,Com is negligible in λ for all PPT adversaries A.
A commitment scheme is perfectly binding if the underlying message is information theoretically fixed by the commitment cmt itself. More precisely, Def inition 4. Com is perfectly binding if there does not exist values (cmt, m 0 , m 1 , r 0 , r 1 ) such that m 0 = m 1 , cmt = Com(m 0 , r 0 ) and cmt = Com(m 1 , r 1 ).
A.3 Digital Signatures.
A digital signature scheme SP = (SPGen, SPSign, SPVerify) with security parameter λ consists of the following algorithms: SPGen outputs a pair (sk SP , vk SP ) of signing and verification keys; and SPSign(sk SP , M ) outputs a signature σ, which is verified by SPVerify(vk SP , M, σ). Now we define the existential unforgeability of the signature scheme under adaptively chosen message attack (EU-CMA) [GMR88] as follows: Let A be an adversary against SP. We define its eu-cma-advantage as 
B Blind Signatures and Their Security
In this section we will recall the notion of blind signatures and define their security. Parts of this section have been taken verbatim from [GRS + 11]. By (a, b) ← X (x), Y(y) we denote interactive execution of algorithms X and Y, where x (resp., y) is the private input of X (resp., Y), and a (resp., b) is the private output of X (resp., Y). We write X ·,Y ∞ for X with oracle access to arbitrarily many interactions with Y. And X ·,Y 1 for X with oracle access to arbitrarily a single interaction with Y.
Def inition 6. A blind signature scheme BS consists of PPT algorithms Gen, Vrfy along with interactive PPT algorithms S, U such that for any λ ∈ N:
• Gen(1 λ ) generates a key pair (sk, vk).
• The joint execution of S(sk) and U(vk, m), where m ∈ {0, 1} λ , generates an output σ for the user and no output for the signer. We write this as (⊥, σ) ← S(sk), U(vk, m) .
• Algorithm Vrfy(vk, m, σ) outputs a bit b.
We require completeness i.e., for any m ∈ {0, 1} λ , and for (sk, vk) ← Gen(1 λ ), and σ output by U in the joint execution of S(sk) and U(vk, m), it holds that Vrfy(vk, m, σ) = 1 with overwhelming probability in λ ∈ N.
Note that it is always possible to sign messages of arbitrary length by applying a collisionresistant hash function to the message prior to signing.
Blind signatures must satisfy two properties: unforgeability and blindness [JLO97, PS00] . For unforgeability we require that a user who runs k executions of the signature-issuing protocol should be unable to output k + 1 valid signatures on k + 1 distinct messages.
Def inition 7.
A blind signature scheme BS = (Gen, S, U, Vrfy) is unforgeable if for any PPT algorithm U * the probability that experiment Unforge BS U * (λ) defined in Figure 2 evaluates to 1 is negligible in λ.
and Vrfy(vk, m * i , σ * i ) = 1 for all i ∈ [k + 1], and at most k interactions with S(sk) were completed.
(issue, st find ) and let σ b , σb denote the (possibly undefined) local outputs of U(vk, m b ) and U(vk, mb) resp.. Blindness says that it should be infeasible for any malicious signer S * to decide which of two messages m 0 and m 1 has been signed first in two executions with an honest user U. This condition must hold, even if S * is allowed to choose the public key maliciously [ANN06] . If one of these executions has returned an invalid signature, denoted by ⊥, then the signer is not informed about the other signature either. We define the advantage of S * in blindness game with respect to the experiment Unblind BS S * (λ) as
Def inition 8. A blind signature scheme BS = (Gen, S, U, Vrfy) satisfies blindness if the advantage function Adv Unblind S * ,BS is negligible for any S * (working in modes find, issue, and guess) running in time poly(λ).
A blind signature scheme is secure if it is unforgeable and blind.
C Efficient Realization of Two-CRS NIZKs using Groth-Sahai Proofs
In this section, we describe how Groth-Sahai (GS) proofs [GS08] can be used to construct efficient Two-CRS NIZK proof system described in section 2.1. Groth and Sahai [GS08] gave direct constructions of NIZKs that do not require NP reductions and thus are efficient in practice. They described these for languages which can be written as a set of following equations: pairing product equations, multi-scalar multiplication equations in base group, and quadratic equations in Z p . For a description of these equations, see Section 2.1. The GS proof system can be instantiated under the DLIN assumption in the setting of symmetric bilinear groups. Next, we give an informal overview of how GS proofs work.
Overview of GS NIZK proofs. GS proofs are given in the common reference string (CRS) model where the CRS consists of commitment keys. GS proofs have two different modes, namely GSSetup B and GSSetup H . These two modes have common reference strings (CRS) coming from two different distributions. In GSSetup B , the CRS has perfectly binding keys and the proofs are perfectly sound. In particular, the CRS consists of a DLIN tuple. In GSSetup H , the CRS has perfectly hiding keys and the proofs are perfectly zero-knowledge. In particular, the CRS consists of non-DLIN tuple. When proving a statement, described as a set of equations, the GS proof system works as follows: The prover first commits to the witness components (using CRS as the commitment key) and then for each equation produces proof elements showing that the corresponding committed values satisfy the equation. The GS proof system satisfies the following properties:
Completeness. GS proof system is perfectly complete under both GSSetup B and GSSetup H . Soundness and Witness Extraction. As stated above, in GSSetup B , GS proofs are perfectly sound. Now we will describe how they achieve witness extraction in GSSetup B mode. This mode, along with CRS, also has an extraction key GSek . GSek consists of the discrete log of the elements in the CRS. Furthermore, GS show a PPT algorithm GSExtr, which given a commitment of a group element, successfully extracts the underlying value. But there is a problem.
Depending on the kind of equations used, the witness can consist of elements in G as well as elements in Z p . While GS proofs under binding keys are proofs of knowledge of group elements (using GSExtr), they are not proofs of knowledge of elements in Z p . In GS proof system, the best one can extract from a commitment to y ∈ Z p is the value g y . Since we assume that the Discrete Log problem is hard in G, there is no way to extract y given this value.
We will solve this problem by using properties of our equations. In the equations we will use in our scheme, y will either be 0 or 1. Hence, the GS proof will also be a proof of knowledge of elements in Z p in our case.
Zero-Knowledge. As stated above, the proofs under GSSetup H are perfect zero-knowledge. In particular, given discrete logs of elements in the CRS, the proofs can be simulated perfectly and efficiently.
CRS indistinguishability. It is easy to observe that the CRSes under GSSetup B and GSSetup H are indistinguishable under the DLIN assumption in G.
Remark 3. A GS proof consists of a constant number of group elements for each variable and each equation. For more details see Figure 2 in [GS08] .
Now we give a description of efficient realization of Two-CRS NIZKs (defined in section 2.1) using the algorithms GSSetup B , GSek and GSExtr.
Efficient Realization of Two-CRS NIZKs. Using GS proofs, we get an efficient realization of Two-CRS NIZKs as follows: Define K B := GSSetup B which outputs a DLIN tuple, crs = (g, g a , g b , g ax , g by , g x+y ). Define τ := GSek = (a, b, x, y). Define E := GSExtr. Define Shift and Shift −1 as deterministic algorithms which change the last element of CRS output by GSSetup B as crs = (g, g a , g b , g ax , g by , g x+y+1 ) ← Shift(crs) and crs = (g, g a , g b , g ax , g by , g x+y−1 ) ← Shift −1 (crs). The prover algorithm P and verification algorithm V are same as the corrresponding algorithms in GS proofs.
Next, we briefly state why the above system satisfies the properties described for Two-CRS NIZK proof systems in section 2.1. Perfect Zero-Knowledge. Since, the CRS output by both Shift and Shift −1 are non-DLIN tuples, they will provide the guarantees given by a key output by GSSetup H . Also, note that the discrete logs output by GSSetup B are a sufficient trapdoor information required to simulate the proofs under crs and crs .
C.1 The Range Equation in our scheme fits the GS framework for NIZKs.
In this section, we describe how we can write a range equation as a set of equations for which efficient GS proofs can be given. A range equation over variable c ∈ Z q is of the form
where q < p. Let number of bits needed to represent q be n. Let x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n−1 be the bit representation of c and A i = g 2 i for all i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}. Then the above equation can be written as
over variables x i ∈ Z p . This can be expressed as
over variables x i ∈ Z p . This is a combination of multiscalar multiplication and quadratic equations and fits well with the GS framework (described above). Note that all possible values for each of x i are 0 and 1 and hence they can be extracted by GSExtr.
D Calculating Parameters
In the following subsections, we will calculate our parameters using work factors for adversaries against the blindness game and unforgeability game.
D.1 Equations from Blindness
For any PPT malicious signer S * for the blindness game against the blind signature scheme given in Section 3, which successfully completes the blindness game, the following holds
where C is an adversary against the DLIN assumption in G such that T(C) = T(S * ) + poly(λ) and B is an adversary against the discrete log problem in G when exponents are chosen uniformly randomly in Z q such that T(B) = T(S * ) + poly(λ).
As we will see, q << p and hence, under best known attacks, for any C, Adv DLIN C,G << Adv dlog B,G,q . Hence, taking Adv Unblind Note that if allow our adversary to run in at most 2 80 steps, i.e. T(S * ) + poly(λ) ≤ 2 80 , and let η = 1, we will get the following: 2 80 ≤ 0.88 e √ q log 2 q 10 3 Solving this equation, we get log 2 q = 155. Using this value of q we will calculate the value of p from the security against unforgeability.
D.2 Equations from Unforgeability proof
For any PPT malicious user U * for the unforgeability game against the blind signature scheme given in Section 3 the following holds:
